Iran - A Tale of Two Armies
Segment #822
The decision by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, approved by Donald Rumsfeld and authorized by President George W. Bush, to disband the Iraqi military via Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 2, is widely regarded by historians and military strategists as one of the most consequential strategic errors in modern history.
By firing approximately 400,000 soldiers—who were stripped of their livelihoods and pensions—the U.S. effectively alienated a massive, trained, and armed Sunni demographic. This created a profound security vacuum, as former military officers and rank-and-file soldiers, left with no stake in the new order, provided the tactical leadership and manpower that would eventually fuel the insurgency and coalesce into the Islamic State (ISIS).
Could We Make the Same Mistake in Iran?
Analysis - Past and Present
Iraq
The background of Paul Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi army is widely regarded by historians and military analysts as a pivotal moment that fueled the insurgency and, eventually, the rise of ISIS.
This policy centered on two "fateful decrees" issued in May 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
The Two Orders
CPA Order No. 1 (De-Ba'athification): This order removed the top four tiers of the Ba’ath Party from all government and civil service positions. While intended to dismantle Saddam Hussein's power structure, it effectively stripped the country of its most experienced bureaucrats, teachers, and doctors, causing the state’s infrastructure to collapse.
CPA Order No. 2 (Dissolution of Entities): This order officially disbanded the Iraqi military, security, and intelligence services. Overnight, approximately 400,000 soldiers were made unemployed and stripped of their pensions and status.
How it Led to ISIS
The connection between these orders and the rise of ISIS is often explained through three main consequences:
1. The "Insurgency Recruitment Pool"
By firing 400,000 trained soldiers without providing an alternative livelihood, the CPA created a massive, angry, and armed workforce with no stake in the new government. As Colin Powell later noted, they became "prime recruits for the insurgency." These men had the tactical knowledge and local connections to wage effective guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces.
2. The Professionalization of Jihad
ISIS was unique because it wasn't just a group of religious radicals; it had the structural discipline of a professional military. This was due to the "Ba'athist-ISIS Marriage." Former high-ranking officers from Saddam’s military—who were secular and often didn't share ISIS's religious extremism—joined the group because they were disenfranchised by the new political order. They provided the "military brain" that allowed ISIS to conquer large territories like Mosul in 2014.
3. The Power Vacuum
The dissolution of the army left Iraq's borders and internal security completely undefended. This vacuum allowed foreign fighters, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which became ISIS), to enter the country and establish roots.
The Controversy
Ambassador Paul Bremer argued that the army had already "demobilized itself" by the time he arrived and that reconstituting it would have terrified the Shia and Kurdish populations who had been oppressed by it.
However, many U.S. military and intelligence officials at the time—including the original head of the reconstruction effort, Jay Garner—vehemently opposed the move, arguing that the regular army should have been kept intact to maintain order.
Key Takeaway: The decision turned a liberation into an occupation, pushing secular military professionals into the arms of radical extremists.
While L. Paul Bremer signed the order, the decision-making process was a point of intense friction between the "men on the ground" in Baghdad and the leadership in Washington.
The decision resulted from a blend of Pentagon drafting, lack of interagency debate, and a "hands-off" approach from the White House. Here is the breakdown of who was involved:
1. The Key Architects at the Pentagon
The order was largely a product of the U.S. Department of Defense, rather than the State Department or the CIA.
Walter Slocombe: A senior advisor to Bremer and former Under Secretary of Defense, Slocombe is often cited as a primary advocate for the dissolution. He argued that the army had already "melted away" and that paying soldiers who weren't working was a waste of resources.
Douglas Feith: As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Feith’s office drafted the original de-Ba'athification and demobilization decrees. Bremer has stated that Feith gave him the specific instructions to show Iraqis that "Saddam’s instruments of repression" had no place in the new nation.
Paul Wolfowitz: The Deputy Secretary of Defense was a vocal supporter of the move, viewing the total dismantling of the old regime's security apparatus as a prerequisite for a democratic Iraq.
2. The Chain of Command
Donald Rumsfeld: As Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld had direct oversight of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer sent the proposal to Rumsfeld on May 19, 2003. Rumsfeld approved it, though in later years he would claim the decision came from "elsewhere" or that it wasn't formulated directly in the Pentagon.
George W. Bush: On May 22, 2003 (the day before the order was signed), Bremer briefed President Bush and the National Security Council (NSC) via video conference. According to accounts from the meeting, there was a period of silence where no one objected, and Bush told Bremer, "You're the guy on the ground."
The Conflict: Bush later claimed in his memoirs that the original policy was to keep the army intact, and he expressed confusion as to why that changed. However, Bremer later released letters showing he had explicitly told the President of his plan to "parallel" de-Ba'athification with the dismantling of the military.
3. Those Who Were "Out of the Loop"
One of the biggest controversies is that the people responsible for Iraqi security were not consulted:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Peter Pace (then Vice Chairman) stated they were never asked for a recommendation.
General Jay Garner: The man Bremer replaced had actually planned to use the Iraqi army for reconstruction. He was blindsided by the order and warned Bremer it would lead to disaster.
The CIA: Then-Director George Tenet later said the decision was made "above Rumsfeld's pay grade" and without proper intelligence assessment.
The "Sunni Triangle"—an area roughly the size of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex stretching between Baghdad, Ramadi, and Tikrit—became the primary engine for the insurgency following Bremer’s decrees.
The impact on this specific region was immediate and devastating because it was the heartland of the former regime’s power base.
1. Economic Devascularization
In the Dallas-sized region of the Sunni Triangle, the military wasn't just a security force; it was the primary employer.
The "Company Town" Effect: Cities like Tikrit and Fallujah functioned like military "company towns." When the army was disbanded, the local economy collapsed instantly.
Loss of Pension and Pride: Thousands of middle-class families in this region lost their only source of income. This turned a professional class of officers into a desperate, motivated resistance.
2. Tactical Evolution: The "Improvised" War
The soldiers in this triangle had access to the country's vast, now-unguarded munitions depots.
The Rise of the IED: Former ordnance officers from the Iraqi Army used their technical knowledge to repurpose artillery shells into Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Small Unit Tactics: Because these men were trained in conventional warfare, they were able to organize localized insurgent cells that used sophisticated "hit and run" tactics against U.S. patrols, particularly along the main supply routes connecting Baghdad to the north.
3. The Religious-Nationalist Merger
The disbanding of the army created a "security vacuum" that radical groups were quick to fill.
Protection Services: In the absence of a national army, local Sunnis turned to tribal leaders and emerging insurgent groups for protection against rising sectarian violence.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI): Abu Musab al-Zarqawi recognized that the disenfranchised soldiers in the Sunni Triangle were his greatest asset. He successfully fused their military expertise with his extremist ideology, forming the nucleus of what would eventually become ISIS.
The Result: A "Perpetual Conflict" Zone
By the time the U.S. realized the regular army was needed to stabilize the Sunni Triangle, the bridge had been burned. The "Sunni Awakening" (the Sahwa) eventually tried to reverse this by paying these same men to fight against Al-Qaeda, but the political damage from 2003 remained a core grievance that ISIS exploited a decade later.
Would you like to see a comparison of the military leadership structures of the old Iraqi Army versus the early ISIS high command?
Iran
The short answer is no, it is highly unlikely that the regular Iranian Army (the Artesh) would act as an independent governing force in the way you might imagine a military junta or an interim governing body.
The structure of the Iranian state is specifically designed to prevent exactly that, keeping the Artesh sidelined from political power while ensuring the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains the true "praetorian guard" of the regime.
1. The "Parallel" Military Design
Following the 1979 revolution, Iran’s new leadership deeply distrusted the Artesh, which had served the Shah. To prevent it from staging a coup, they established the IRGC as a parallel, ideologically driven force.
Artesh (Regular Army): Focused on conventional defense, territorial integrity, and standard military doctrine. It is intentionally kept separate from the political and economic levers of the state.
IRGC: Created to protect the "revolution" itself. It reports directly to the Supreme Leader, bypassing the civilian government and the Artesh chain of command. It has its own ground, naval, aerospace, and intelligence branches, plus control over the Basij militia.
2. Why the Artesh Can't Govern
Lack of Political Infrastructure: The Artesh lacks the institutional ties to the clerical establishment that the IRGC possesses. In Iran, power flows through the Supreme Leader’s office (Beit-e Rahbari) and the intricate networks of the IRGC. The Artesh is effectively a "service provider" for defense rather than a political stakeholder.
Systemic Marginalization: Over decades, the regime has systematically underfunded the Artesh while prioritizing the IRGC. IRGC officers frequently occupy senior government and cabinet positions, while Artesh officers are often excluded from these decision-making roles.
The "Pasdaranization" of the Army: The regime has worked to integrate loyalists into the Artesh and install IRGC-aligned commanders in key oversight positions to ensure the army remains subservient.
3. Comparison to Iraq
The situation in Iraq after 2003 was a unique collapse of a state apparatus. In Iran, the state remains robust, and the military structure is purposefully fragmented to prevent any one branch—especially the regular army—from gaining enough consolidated power to challenge the clerical leadership.
While the Artesh possesses the raw manpower and critical equipment (like air defense), it lacks the political mandate, the ideological cohesion, and the direct access to the Supreme Leader that makes the IRGC the dominant force in Iran's governance.
To better understand why the IRGC holds this unique position, this video explains the specific role and origins of the dual-military system: Why Iran has Two Armies?.
This video is relevant because it breaks down the historical context and functional differences between the Artesh and the IRGC, illustrating why the latter serves as the primary political and security arm of the regime.